| The
Haitian Revolution
by Bob Corbett
Part
IV: Napoleon's West Indian policy
and the Haitian "gift" to the United States
NAPOLEON'S WEST INDIAN POLICY
AND THE HAITIAN "GIFT" TO THE UNITED STATES
It is general folk knowledge in Haiti
that Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian revolutionaries saved
the United States from being invaded by Napoleonic forces in 1803.
This popular lore surfaces often in discussions with Haitians, particularly
when the speakers are complaining about later U.S. policy and treatment
of Haiti. The general suggestion is that the United States was indeed
saved almost single handedly by the Haitians, and that the U.S.
is extremely ungrateful for the service rendered it. Further, I've
often heard this point raised to underline the ignorance that Americans
typically have of the relative importance each nation held on he
stage of world politics in 1802-03.
Certainly the French colony, San Domingue,
and the early Republic of Haiti, played a much more important role
in Caribbean and world politics than does present day Haiti. The
major powers of the region, France, Britain, Spain and the United
States, were slave owning, slave trading nations. They faced serious
threats from a non-slave nation, particularly one whose citizens
were former slaves who had risen up and defeated the major powers
in a revolutionary struggle.
The French, of course, regretted the
loss of an enormously rich colony. The British feared the impact
of the Haitian Revolution on Jamaica and her other slave colonies.
The U.S. worried about the impact of the servile revolution on the
south of its own nation. Spain had lost her colony of Santo Domingo,
next door to San Domingue, and feared the spread of her influence
to Puerto Rico and Cuba.
Yet the major powers had their own
problems with one another. While San Domingue/Haiti loomed far larger
in international significance that present day Haiti, nonetheless,
there was no uniform resistance among the four major powers. They
each had various problems with one another, often in relationship
to Haiti, and thus could not come to exert a unitary resistance.
The Haitian Revolution became a tool to be manipulated by the major
powers in their own struggles with one another, while, at the same
time, each tried to gain its own advantages vis-a-vis the new republic.
In it's strongest form the popular
Haitian version of this story is that Napoleon Bonaparte had a secret
plot to take the United States. On this view General Laclerc and
his troops would first stop off briefly at San Domingue to put down
Toussaint Louverture and his upstart revolutionaries, then move
on to French Louisiana, which would serve as a base from which to
harry the southern parts of the United States. Thus the successful
Haitian resistance is seen as having saved the United States. I
will refer to this theory as the linear plot, since it moves right
along in a line from France, to San Domingue, to New Orleans to
Washington.
A seemingly weaker version of this
plot theory is that Napoleon wished to establish a strong hold in
the West Indies for France and that recovering control over San
Domingue, its richest colonial holding, was crucial for this program.
Then near-by French Louisiana could be a source of food supply for
the more productive and economically more attractive San Domingue,
ensuring a strong contribution to France from its West Indian holdings.
I will call this view the San Domingue-center view, since the colony
of San Domingue is the core of the policy and New Orleans is merely
a supply outpost.
My own view leans toward a version
of the San Domingue-center theory. I believe that Napoleon wanted
to re-establish control over San Domingue and believed that French
Louisiana was essential to that plan. Further, the United States
was certainly a beneficiary of the successful Haitian Revolution.
Since San Domingue, and not Louisiana nor the United States was
the center piece of Napoleon's West Indian strategy, once San Domingue
was lost to France, Louisiana became an uninteresting and untenable
piece of real estate. On this view the United States is indirectly
indebted to Haiti for one of the best real estate buys in history--the
Louisiana Purchase, but the U.S. was not really "saved"
from Napoleonic domination or invasion by the Haitians' successful
revolution.
GENERAL STRATEGY FOR MY ARGUMENT
If one follows the documents available,
and accepts at face value the various statements of the principals,
especially Napoleon himself, then there is no case at all to make
for the linear plot theory. The puzzle is that the linear plot theory
survives today as the dominate belief in Haitian folk history, and
has even persuaded some important historians of its truth.
One might account for its longevity
by the tendency of any people to glorify its own history and to
accept attractive historical myths as truths. Americans, for example,
cling to the romantic George Washington stories of the cherry tree
and of his sailing a silver dollar across the Potomac.
On the other hand it may be that the
story just needs to be clarified and investigated to remind us what
was going on in 1802-03. This is the primary aim of my paper.
THE SETTING LEADING TO THE LACLERC EXPEDITION
The Haitian Revolution began in 1791.
Influenced by the French Revolution's recognition of the Rights
of Man, driven by the excessive cruelty of French slavery, the slaves
rose up in August of 1791. Toussaint Louverture, over 40 when the
revolution broke out, rose in power and by 1793 was a leading general
of the revolution, along with Jean-Francois and Biassou. The three
had sided with the Spanish against the French and were sheltered
in the Spanish part of the island (the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo).
The Spanish also supplied weapons and other material support to
the rebels.
However, Toussaint returned to the
French side when he became convinced that there was a better chance
for emancipation with them. French Commissioner Sonthonax had emancipated
the slaves and the Directory in Paris recognized this emancipation
in Feb. 1794. By April of that year, shortly after word arrived
back from France of the Directory's emancipation, Toussaint switched
sides and began to war against both the Spanish and British, and
to war for France.
By July of 1801 Toussaint had emerged
as the leading figure in San Domingue, and seemed headed toward
declaring an independent republic. He had defeated the Spanish and
British, maneuvered the French Commissioners out of the colony,
defeated Andre Rigaud in a Civil War, taken possession of the eastern
portion of the island which had recently been ceded to France by
Spain, eradicated slavery on the entire island and promulgated a
constitution in which he was declared governor general for life.
Both Britain and the United States treated with Toussaint as though
he were the head of an independent state, though Toussaint's constitution
and public demeanor was to claim that he was a loyal French citizen
who had saved the colony for France.
Virtually no one believed Toussaint's
claims of loyalty to France. Britain and the United States wanted
to deal with Toussaint to ensure an end of French privateering from
San Dominguan waters. Both nations hoped to contain the slave rebellion
to San Domingue alone. Both nations strove to out do one another
in establishing trade relations with Toussaint's government, in
defiance of France's regulations for the colony. Thus Napoleon might
well be excused if he took with a healthy dose of salt Toussaint's
claims of being a loyal son and protector of French rights in San
Domingue.
THE ORIGINS OF NAPOLEON'S WEST INDIAN
POLITY PRECEDED HIM
Nonetheless, the general policy which
Napoleon followed was not created by him, but by the Directory before
Napoleon became First Consul. Napoleon's own coup d'etat in France
took place on Nov. 9, 1799. But the essence of what would soon become
Napoleon's West Indian policy was already in place.
In 1795 the Directory acquired Santo
Domingo, though they never sought to take possession. Also they
began to seek retrocession of Louisiana. They recognized that San
Domingue was the golden goose of their West Indian possessions,
but that it could not be reliably supplied from France because the
British fleet controlled the Caribbean. New Orleans was recognized
as the necessary supply center from which needed food stuffs could
be more easily shipped to San Domingue than from France. The Directory,
as Napoleon later on, perceived Toussaint to be a threat to the
continued colonial status of San Domingue. Just as the Directory
tried to rid itself of Napoleon himself by sending him off to Egypt,
so it sought to rid itself of Toussaint by involving him in disastrous
foreign adventures. On May 23, 1799 Edward Stevens, Consul General
of the U.S. to San Domingue, wrote to General Maitland, formerly
the head of the British forces: "The Agency of San-Domingo
had received positive orders from the Executive Directory to invade
both the Southern States of America and the island of Jamaica. Gen.
Toussaint Louverture was consulted on the best mode of making the
attack."
Stevens, writing to Secretary of State
Timothy Pickering, saw that this was a double edged order--if it
succeeded, France would win a great prize in Jamaica, but, if it
didn't it would be rid of Toussaint:
Success would forever separate from
Great Britain one of her most valuable colonies and diminish her
resources. Should they [Toussaint and his army] fail, they will
fall victims to their rashness and presumption or like Bonaparte
and his army cease to be objects of dread and jealousy to the
Government of France. The old system might then be restored in
St. Domingo and slavery reestablished.
Toussaint wisely refused this order.
However, it has always seemed to me that this direct plot, insincere
as it may have been on the Directory's part, is not an unlikely
source of the beginnings of the linear plot theory which I described
above. The mistake of this interpretation would be putting the plot
into Napoleon's mouth, and believing it a sincere plot to invade
the United States, rather than an attempt to rid France of Toussaint.
THE LINEAR PLOT THEORY AND THE AMERICAN
FEDERALISTS
Napoleon may have inherited the essence
of his West Indian policy, but he immediately turned up the heat.
Having taken over in November British navy in the Caribbean. Just
six days after their treaty was signed Napoleon began the plans
for an invasion force to be sent to San Domingue. The British and
American attitudes toward San Domingue had been mixed. The British
invaded San Domingue s to tellit never actually took control from
the Spanish.
At the same time Napoleon was working
to put his West Indian policy into effect. On September 30, 1800,
the day before the retrocession treaty with Spain, the French and
Americans signed a treaty ending their two year old quasi-war. This
left the British, with whom France was at war, as the major stumbling
block to Napoleon's plans. It was another whole year before Napoleon
managed a peace treaty with Britain, freeing him from the dangers
of the British navy in the Caribbean. Just six days after their
treaty was signed Napoleon began the plans for an invasion force
to be sent to San Domingue.
The British and American attitudes
toward San Domingue had been mixed. The British invaded San Domingue
s to tell Laclerc how Napoleon wants Toussaint subdued, slowly,
with flattery to lower his guard, and then with ruthlessness. This
is exactly what Laclerc seems to have achieved. Napoleon's primary
mistake was to think that the elimination of Toussaint was the immediate
end of the revolution.
But, more to the point of this story
is that the secret instructions make clear that Napoleon was out
to re-establish San Domingue in all her prior glory. This he recognized
required the reintroduction of slavery and the complete return of
the old regime.
He tells Laclerc:
The Spaniards, the British and the
Americans are equally worried to see a Black Republic. The admiral
and the major general will write memorandums to the neighboring
establishments in order to let them know the goal of the government,
the common advantage for the Europeans to destroy the Black Rebellion
and the hope to be seconded.
Later on he is more specific: "Commerce
must, during the 1st, 2nd and 3rd periods be accessible to Americans,
but after the 3rd period, Frenchmen only will be admitted and the
ancient rules from before the Revolution will be put back into force."
In order for France to recapture the
grandeur that was San Domingue, Napoleon needed to put down the
black rebellion, reestablish slavery, and equally importantly, refuse
all trade with Britain and the United States. When San Domingue
was producing her fabulous wealth for France it was because the
exclusif was in effect, that is, San Domingue was required to trade
exclusively with France, both for her imports and exports. Certainly
Louisiana played an important role in Napoleon's policy. As Henry
Adams says:
St. Domingo, like all the West Indies,
suffered as a colony under a serious disadvantage, being dependent
for its supplies on the United States--a dangerous neighbor both
by its political example and its commercial and maritime rivalry
with the mother country. The First Consul hoped to correct this
evil by substituting Louisiana for the United States as a source
of supplies for St. Domingo.
Napoleon's vision is a San Domingue-centered
vision. She was to be the great producer of wealth, reverting to
her slave status. Louisiana was important to the plan, but Louisiana
was relegated to the role of an agricultural supplier for the hungry
slaves of San Domingue, and as a front-line protector from allowing
the United States a trade foot in the door. Nonetheless, Napoleon's
West Indian policy looks first and foremost to San Domingue.
Perhaps one of the strongest arguments
against the linear plot and for the San Domingue-center plot is
the Louisiana Purchase. Napoleon was soundly defeated in San Domingue
and Haiti was born of the ashes of that battle. But, if Louisiana
had been the actual target, then Napoleon could have extricated
himself earlier and by-passed San Domingue to continue on toward
his main target. He would have reasoned that it was not Toussaint
who defeated him, but yellow fever, which was a favorite explanations
of many white racists. He would have given up on San Domingue as
unfit for Frenchmen, and moved on to Louisiana. What he did in fact,
however, was to sell Louisiana as soon as it became clear that he
was not going to retake San Domingue. What's the point in an excellent
supply depot if there's nothing to supply.
Henry Adams gives evidence that Napoleon
was considering selling Louisiana as early as April, 1803, seven
months before the French finally surrendered in Haiti. Adams sums
up the situation succinctly:
Without that island the system had
hands, feet, and even a head, but no body. Of what use was Louisiana,
when France had clearly lost the main colony which Louisiana was
meant to feed and fortify?... Not only had the island of St. Domingo
been ruined by the war, its plantations destroyed, its labor paralyzed,
and its population reduced to barbarism...but...the army dreaded
service in St. Domingo, where certain death awaited every soldier;
the expense was frightful; a year of war had consumed fifty thousand
men and money in vast amounts, with no other result than to prove
that at least as many men and as much money would be still needed
before any return could be expected for so lavish an expenditure.
In Europe war could be made to support war; in St. Domingo peace
alone could but slowly repair some part of this frightful waste.
The deal to sell the Louisiana Territory
was well underway in the last days of the Laclerc expedition, and
was actually concluded before the French left San Domingue, though
the official sale, like the official birth of Haiti, is in 1804.
HAITI'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNITED STATES
The interesting and ironic part of
this story is that what at first seems to be the weaker and less
glorious of the plots is actually the stronger and more glorious
position for Haiti. On the linear plot theory, Napoleon was headed
for the United States through Louisiana with a quick stop over in
San Domingue. Then, Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian masses
stopped the French dead in their tracks. The French, beaten and
discouraged, spared the United States and returned home.
But notice that what makes this story
interesting is the assumption that the most important entity is
the United States and not Haiti. What is glorious is that the tiny,
insignificant nation of Haiti saved the important great giant with
its unlikely victory over the French forces. However, on the San
Domingue-center theory, Haiti is the key and center of Napoleon's
whole West Indian strategy. Louisiana, which recall is not the United
States, but a French colony, is an important supply depot, but secondary
to the whole plot. The United States is a competitive nation, trying
to cut into France's trade relations with its richest colony.
Certainly the United States feared
France's presence in Louisiana, especially with the imperialist
Napoleon Bonaparte on the throne. But it was the lost trade with
San Domingue that most frightened the U.S. Jefferson recognized
this. He was himself a Republican and not a Federalist, and was
president during Napoleon's attack on San Domingue. He seems not
to have feared that Napoleon had designs the United States. Nonetheless
he had a clear idea of the interrelation between Louisiana, San
Domingue, France and the U.S. On April 18, 1802 he wrote Edward
Livingstone, American Minister in Paris, that New Orleans "...is
the one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual
enemy...The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes
the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water
mark...From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet
and nation."
Jefferson was confident that the French
would not succeed in San Domingue, and supplied Toussaint with arms,
munitions and food, regarding him, as the Federalist linear plot
did too, as the first line of defense against Napoleonic aggression.
But the aggression Jefferson feared was not a direct threat to United
States territorial integrity, but an undesired and untenable French
presence in Louisiana. He believed that Toussaint would put up considerable
resistance, and he counted on pressing affairs in Europe to turn
Napoleon from his West Indian policy.
Thus on the San Domingue-center theory
Haiti becomes much more important than it would otherwise. It is
recognized by Napoleon, and the French Directorate before him, as
the most important factor of its West Indian's policy, and more
important than Louisiana. At the same time, the heroic fighting
of the Haitians presents Louisiana to the United States on a silver
platter. Consequently, the part of the story which the Haitians
so love to acknowledge -- their contribution to the well being of
the United States -- is well preserved.
Finally, this view emphasizes that
in the relative importance of nations, there was a time when Haiti
was not important for what she did or didn't do for the big brother
across the gulf stream, but extremely important in her own right,
sought after by Napoleon himself. The seemingly "lesser"
view becomes the more significant when viewed from this perspective.
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